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The dissertation consists of three essays that employ predictive analytics, 
structural modeling techniques and field experiments to understand and nudge customers’ 
behaviors in two types of online engagement platforms. The first one is customers’ 
purchase behaviors in an online grocery store and the other is customer’ contribution 
behaviors in a reward-based crowdfunding platform. In both contexts, we study how to 
actively nudge their behaviors. In Chapter 2, we investigates how, when dealing with 
products that are available in limited quantities, customers may be nudged to purchase 
them. Specifically, our main problem is to identify targeted customers to receive the 
limited number of coupons. We develop a Support Vector Machines (SVM) based 
approach to rank order customers. We conduct a field experiment in an online grocery 
store to evaluate how well the identified customers are nudged through information 
and/or couponing.  We find that, in terms of the successful nudges, our SVM-based 
approach performed better than other approaches.     
We are not just focusing on nudging customers to purchase but also on nudging 
them to contribute. In Chapter 3, we examine how to leverage the project reward 




We develop a structural model of the backer’s dynamic pledging and learning behaviors. 
We use it to test a variety of behavioral theories of how PRS and intertemporal
changes in the PRS influence backers’ pledging decisions over the course of a project’s 
funding period. We also use the model to run market simulations and shed lights on how 
to offer the PRS changes and what is the optimal timing to make such changes.  
Coupons often act as price discrimination tools to nudge low willingness-to-pay 
customers to purchase. However, in our context where there is limited product 
availability, strategies other than just sending coupons may be desirable. For some 
customers, it is sufficient that we provide information alone but no coupons. Also 
coupons of different discount depths might play a different role as customers might 
update their expectations. Particularly, in Chapter 4, we investigate the impact of 
different nudging strategies on customers’ purchase behaviors. We evaluate the 
effectiveness of those different nudging strategies via a randomized field experiment. 
Consistent with the prior literature, we found coupons could serve as a form of 
“advertisement”. Furthermore, our findings show that coupons with a low discount rate 
could have a longer information carryover effect than those with a higher discount one. 
The experiment also generated insights about when couponing as opposed to information 




CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
With the increasing importance of big data and business analytics in the business 
area and predictive analytics in the academic world (Shmueli & Koppius 2011), our 
research pays close attention to leveraging vast amount of data to learn and predict 
customers’ online behavior, provide insights to business managers and contribute to 
academic research as well. Much of the information systems and operation management 
literature appears to treat the end-customer demand to be exogenous (Bernstein and 
Federgruen, 2005; Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). However, there are many real world 
examples in which customers’ demand can be nudged using information technology.  
Zara is an example of a firm where consumer demand is nudged by limiting production 
even if it meant leaving demand unsatisfied (Ghemawat and Nueno, 2003). Shaping the 
consumer demand is more easily accomplished in the Internet channel given the store’s 
ability to adapt the offering as well as track individual consumers’ behavior. In this 
dissertation, we explore different ways and strategies that companies could employ to 
nudge customers’ behaviors in two types of online engagement platforms, such as an 
online grocery store and a reward-based crowdfunding platform.   
In Chapter 2, we investigates how, when dealing with products that are available 
in limited quantities but still exceeds the current demand, customers may be nudged to 




 receive the limited number of coupons. This implies that we have to be able to rank order 
customers based on their purchase potential, an issue that is non-existent in most 
recommendation systems. We develop a Support Vector Machines (SVM) based 
approach to rank order customers. The underlying notion is that Type I errors in our 
classifier are not necessarily problematic but are potential nudging targets.  Also, as a 
consequence, traditional ways of evaluating classifiers (with Type I and Type II errors) 
are not appropriate. Therefore, we conduct a field experiment to evaluate how well the 
identified customers are nudged through information and/or couponing.  We find that, in 
terms of the successful nudges, our SVM-based approach performed better than other 
approaches.     
We are not just focusing on nudging customers to purchase but also on nudging 
them to contribute, such as on reward-based crowdfunding platforms. In Chapter 3, we 
collect data from Kickstarter, a funding platform for creative projects, and examine how 
to leverage the project reward structure (PRS) to nudge consumers to contribute. Our 
preliminary analysis reveals that PRS does matter in determining the success of the 
projects. Furthermore, we have developed a structural model of the backer’s dynamic 
pledging decision and learning behaviors. We use it to test a variety of behavioral 
theories of how PRS and intertemporal changes in the PRS influence backers’ pledging 
decisions over the course of a project’s funding period. Furthermore, we also use the 
model to run additional market simulations and shed lights on how to offer the PRS 
changes over the course of the funding period and what is the optimal timing to make 




Coupons often act as price discrimination tools to nudge low willingness-to-pay 
customers to purchase. However, in our context where there is limited product 
availability, strategies other than just sending coupons may be desirable. For some 
customers, it is sufficient that we provide information alone but no coupons. Also, when 
a coupon is provided, customers may perceive the product to be unpopular and therefore 
may anchor their valuations for the product lower. Coupons of different discount depths 
might play a different role when the anchoring effects are considered. So it is valuable to 
understand the effects of coupons versus information on nudging customers to purchase 
the product. Particularly, in Chapter 4, we investigate the impact of different nudging 
strategies, such as information only, low discount, high discount, on customers’ purchase 
behaviors. We evaluate the effectiveness of those different nudging strategies via a 
randomized field experiment. Consistent with the prior literature, we found coupons 
could serve as a form of “advertisement”. Furthermore, our findings show that coupons 
with a low discount rate could have a longer information carryover effect than those with 
a higher discount one. Furthermore, the experiment also generated insights about when 
couponing as opposed to information is more effective when nudging different types of 
customers. 
Our research is of great significance to both academic research and industry 
practice. Our work contributes to the literature of predictive analytics, machine learning, 
recommender systems, email targeting, crowdfunding and consumer behaviors in 
different online contexts. Meanwhile, we offer useful big data analytics tools for 
managers to identify targeted customers for products with limited availability. Also we 




Moreover, we provide guidelines to entrepreneurs about leveraging the project reward 
structure to nudge backers to contribute on crowdfunding platforms. Our work also 





CHAPTER 2.  A RECOMMENDER SYSTEM TO NUDGE 
CUSTOMERS IN A CAPACITY CONSTRAINED SUPPLY 
CHAIN 
2.1 Introduction 
Traditional models in the supply chain literature (e.g., Bernstein and Federgruen, 
2005, Cachon and Lariviere, 2005) have treated the end-customer demand to be 
exogenous.  However, allowing for shaping customer behavior gives the firm another 
degree of freedom to improve its supply chain efficiency.  For example, Zara offers 
products only over a limited duration, creating a sense of urgency amongst its customers.  
This urgency implicitly goads the customer to purchase the products immediately.  Zara 
takes advantage of this shaped behavior and has built its supply chain to benefit from it 
(Petro, 2013).  Internet technologies and availability of plethora of data enables firms to 
more effectively shape customers. Perhaps, because of that motivation, many firms have 
brought in-house the order fulfillment of their electronic channels, which they had 
originally outsourced (Duhigg 2012).  In this paper, we investigate one possible way of 
firms nudging customers by taking into account the supply chain constraints.  
We develop a recommendation system that takes into account product availability 
constraints, implement it in an online grocery store context, and evaluate the 
implementation.  The grocery firm we work with acts as an intermediary between local 




that the firm faces availability constraints for some of its products (because they are 
sourced from small farms) but the available quantities still exceed the current demand. 
Therefore, the firm has the motivation to identify the targeted customers for the unused 
though limited supply, instead of simply blanketing all customers with coupons. Our 
objective is to promote limited quantities of a high-margin product in the presence of 
limited availability. For this purpose, we develop an SVM-based approach. Our technique 
is different from those in typical existing recommendation systems such as content-based 
filtering and collaborative filtering because the feature set in the grocery context is not as 
comprehensive as in other contexts (for details about the differences, see Section 2.2). 
Our main objective with the proposed technique is to identify a subset of Type I error 
records that can potentially be nudged and evaluate the strength of identification using an 
experiment.   
There are two ways in which we conduct the evaluations.  First, we compare the 
SVM-based approach against other standard techniques such as logit regression, and k-
Nearest Neighbors (kNN) using the historical dataset. We split the historical data into 
training and testing periods on a rolling time window. After training, we analyze how 
well the predictions are about customers’ future purchasing habits, and we find the SVM-
based approach to perform better. Since evaluations based only on the historical data 
cannot measure the effectiveness of nudging, we also conduct a field experiment, which 
becomes the second manner of evaluation. In the experiment, subjects are nudged using a) 
information only; b) low discount; or c) high discounts. We study the impact of the 





In short, we believe that our work provides both academic rigor and practical 
relevance.  We contribute to the literature on supply chain, predictive analytics, and 
recommender systems.  To the best of our knowledge, none of the prior works have 
considered a recommendation system that considers the supply chain constraints.  We 
develop and demonstrate the effectiveness of the recommendation system through a 
combination of analysis and experiment. The analysis of data from our experiment also 
provides useful managerial insights.  
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 provides an overview of the 
related literature.  Section 2.3 presents our SVM-based approach.  In Section 2.4, we 
describe the data and research context. In Section 2.5, we evaluate our proposed approach 
using historical transaction data.  Section 2.6 describes the field experiment we conducted.  
Finally, we conclude in Section 2.7 by discussing the theoretical and managerial 
implications. 
2.2 Overview of the Related Literature 
There is an increasing interest in predictive analytics in the information systems 
(IS) community recently (Sahoo et al. 2012; Shmueli and Koppius 2011; Wang et al. 
2013; Zheng and Padmanabhan 2006). In our context, we use predictive analytics instead 
of explanatory statistical models. Predictive models are designed to predict customers’ 
out-of-sample behaviors while explanatory models are better suited to provide in-sample 




2.2.1 Recommender System Techniques 
Note that there are two widely adopted recommender system techniques: content-
based filtering and collaborative filtering.  For detailed literature review, refer to Koren et 
al. (2009), Sahoo et al. (2012) and Adomavicius and Tuzhilin (2005). The content-based 
filtering technique in general has highly demanding data requirements. It requires that the 
properties of product items, such as genres of movies and music, be specified. Also, it 
needs customers’ explicit preferences, such as user ratings (i.e., after experiencing this 
product, the user tells us whether he/she liked or disliked it, and how much, by providing 
a rating on a scale of, for example, 1 to 5). Possibly due to the data requirements, this 
method is not widely adopted.  
The collaborative filtering technique, in contrast, has less demanding data 
requirements, and is widely incorporated in recommender engines (Koren et al. 2009).  In 
general, there are two main approaches to collaborative filtering: the neighborhood 
method and the latent factor model (Koren et al. 2009). The neighborhood approach may 
be either user- or item-oriented, and is based on similarity measures such as Pearson 
correlation coefficient (Hu et al. 2008).  In the user-oriented implementation, which is its 
original form, the neighborhood approach estimates unknown ratings based on recorded 
ratings of users. The item-oriented implementation, which has become popular due to its 
easy interpretability, predicts unknown ratings based on items most similar to the focal 
item.  Note that the both implementations are based on explicit feedback from users, such 
as ratings.  
The latent factor approach is used to uncover underlying factors that could explain 




characterizing the latent factors of users and items (Bell et al. 2007; Paterek 2007). The 
traditional form of those latent factor models is also based on explicit feedback, such as 
ratings.  
Of late, there is a growing interest in developing collaborative filtering algorithms 
for situations where only the implicit feedback is available. For example, Hu et al. (2008) 
developed a model based on the matrix factorization technique to account for implicit 
feedbacks based on the frequency of people watching TV shows. One key feature of the 
matrix factorization technique is that it requires characterization of a reasonable set of 
latent factors that can capture the product characteristics. For the aforementioned study, 
the TV genre set (such as comedy, action, horror, etc.) is small but comprehensive.   
There has been some recent effort to design the collaborative filtering technique 
when preferences dynamically change.  Sahoo et al. (2012) characterize a Hidden 
Markov Model (HMM) and compare the HMM-based algorithm to other algorithms in 
dynamic settings.   
We evaluated the applicability of the aforementioned techniques to the online 
grocery context.  First, as we detail later, we do not have explicit feedback about 
customer preferences.  We only have data about their purchase history.  Second, neither 
do we have the comprehensive feature set that characterizes customers’ decision-making 
processes.  For example, different products (e.g., tomatoes and onions) have different 
feature sets.  The decision to consume a particular product not only depends on the 
individual’s taste preference for the product but also on additional processing that may be 
done before consumption.  It is natural for us not to be aware of those details. Third, the 




the HMM-based approach that we discussed earlier is not relevant to our context.  For 
these reasons, we develop an SVM-based recommender system.  
SVM, with origins in machine learning, transforms the original feature space into 
a higher-dimensional feature space via the kernel trick (Vapnik 2000). The SVM 
technique has been found to be robust in various contexts. Prior literature has found that 
SVM performs better than multinomial logistic regressions in marketing (Cui and Curry 
2005) and that SVM outperforms several other techniques, such as neural networks etc. 
in forecasting stock market movement direction in finance (Huang et al. 2005). Another 
salient feature of our paper is the managerial insights we generate from the experiment to 
evaluate our approach. For this reason, we briefly survey the work on the impact of 
recommender systems. 
2.2.2 Impact of Recommender System 
At the aggregate level, prior research has found that recommendations can have a 
positive effect on sales and web impressions (Ansari et al. 2000; Das et al. 2007; 
Bodapati 2008; De et al. 2010). There is a broader set of papers (Fleder and Hosanagar 
2009; Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2012; Hervas-Drane 2013) that have studied 
when products gain as opposed to lose sales because of recommendations; or whether 
recommendations increase the market for niche goods as opposed to “long tails.”  For 
example, Fleder and Hosanagar (2009), show that counter to popular perception, 
recommendations can lead to a reduction in sales diversity. 
Prior research has also studied the impacts of the recommender systems at the 




based (salesperson, independent experts), other humans (such as friends and 
acquaintances), and an online recommendation.  They conclude that online 
recommendations could be more effective when compared with humans’ 
recommendations. Some studies corroborate that providing customers with a predicted 
system rating introduces anchoring biases that significantly influence customers’ 
preference ratings (Cosley et al. 2003; Adomavicius et al. 2011). Adomavicius et al. 
(2014) study the impact of recommender systems on customers’ willingness to pay in the 
context of purchasing digital songs. Hosanagar et al. (2013) found that personalization 
brought by recommender systems helps widen users’ interests and thus creates 
commonality among users.  Even though our paper is mainly focused on developing a 
recommendation system, we also evaluate the effectiveness of the recommendation 
system to various types of forms of nudging (information, low-discount, or high-
discount). 
2.3 Our SVM-Based Recommender System 
SVM is called the “maximum margin classifier”. It is based on maximizing the 
margins between two classes of an output to identify a separating hyperplane in a higher-
dimensional space (Refer to Appendix A for details about SVM). SVM with a Gaussian 
kernel is recommended in scenarios similar to ours where the number of data points is 
rather not huge (Hsu et al. 2010). Specifically, we develop a non-linear SVM based 
recommender system that uses the Gaussian kernel transformation to identify the targeted 
customers who are among the people with high propensity of purchasing the focal 




We would like to highlight the differences in processes associated with a standard 
classification task and ours.  In general, classifiers are trained using the training dataset 
and tested on the test dataset.  The testing involves evaluating the correctness of the 
classification, i.e., analyzing the number of Type I and II errors, in the testing dataset.  In 
scenarios where costs associated with Type I and II errors are different, and when testing 
on the testing dataset, those variations in costs are also considered to infer the expected 
cost incurred by the classifier (Witten et al. 2011).  Therefore, the choice of the classifier 
is often based on the expected cost measures.   
Recall that our objective is not to simply train the classifier and evaluate them 
based on the testing dataset.  We are interested in identifying a restricted number of target 
customers to be nudged.  The underlying notion in our approach is that Type I errors in 
our dataset are not necessarily problematic but potentially involve customers who have 
not purchased the focal product because they are unaware of the product’s availability.  
In an abstract sense, we are seeking to identify a subset of records with Type I errors to 
nudge.  Of course, the cardinality of the subset is based on the restriction from the online 
grocer.  Then, our focus is to develop a rank order for the Type I errors to choose the top 
ranked records for nudging.   
2.3.1 Steps 
Even though we maintain our focus on the SVM approach, we also compare it 
against other classifiers.  Given that our objective is different from other prediction tasks 
studied in general, the steps below to identify the customers to be nudged are agnostic to 




Step 1: We use the entire sample as the training set.  We train the classifier on the 
training set and obtain the best parameters by maximizing the cross-validation accuracy.  
Such a process is recommended for SVM by Chang and Lin (2011).  Obviously, we 
extend the approach to other classifiers also and the best parameters obtained depend on 
the technique adopted. 
Step 2: The classifier is implemented with the best parameter combination from 
the previous step on the entire training set (not just on the subset as we do in the n-fold 
cross validation).  
Step 3: Type I errors from the Step 2 implementation is considered for rank 
ordering.  The way in which the customers are ranked ordered may differ across the 
techniques.  The top-ranked customers that are obtained as a consequence are selected for 
further analysis.  
Step 4: We evaluate the output from Step 3 in two ways: (1) passively, we use the 
historical data to evaluate how well the identified customers performed in the following 
periods; (2) more actively, we conduct a field experiment where the identified customers 
are nudged through information and/or couponing.  The first way is indicative of the 
natural process of discovery of the focal product by the customers.  The second way is a 
more useful test of our technique. 
In the SVM approach, we are interested in the regularization and variance 
parameters of the kernel function for Step 1.  Specifically, we initially use a coarse grid-
search method, followed by a better-region-only grid-search to obtain the optimal 
parameter combination.  At each stage, we use the sequential minimal optimization (refer 




corresponding to the SVM approach, we rank order the Type I “errored” records 
according to their corresponding distance from the separating hyperplane.  As we discuss 
later, we compare our SVM-based approach to other approaches as well.  In one alternate 
approach, we estimate a logit model that is a model in marketing to study customers’ 
discrete choices.  The categorical variable in the SVM approach is treated as the response 
variable in logit model and the feature set correspond to the predictor variables. Similarly, 
the potential customers are rank ordered according to the fitted probability of purchasing 
this product. The higher probability the customers have, the higher rank they receive in 
Step 3.  In yet another approach we study the kNN technique, which is widely used in 
collaborative filtering. We rank order potential customers based on the mean distance of 
them from surrounding grass-fed customers among k neighbors (k=10, 20).  Finally, we 
also compare against a random selection strategy by randomly drawing M (for different 
values M=100, 200,… 1000) customers, calculating the number of successes, and redoing 
the process 20 times to compute the average.   
2.4 Research Context and Data Source 
We evaluate our technique in an online grocery store, where the firm acts as an 
intermediary between local farms, food partners, and customers. The purchase-to-
delivery process works as follows: (1) customers place orders online and specify the 
pickup location (usually a meeting place such as schools, churches, etc.); (2) the firm 
picks up the order from local farms and food partners; (3) the firm takes its delivery 
trucks to the pre-destined sites; (4) the last mile problem is usually handled by customers 




We intend to evaluate the nudging of customers to purchase grass fed beef.  The 
product choice is ideal in many regards.  First, the margins are high for this product and 
the firm prefers that high potential customers be exposed to it soon.  So, the firm was 
willing to send out limited number of coupons to expose customers.  Second, grass-fed 
appears to be a healthy option for customers (Cross 2011). Third, there appears to be 
quite a bit of variation in customers’ knowledge about this product.  So, it is possible for 
customers, who have not purchased the product because of the lack of information, may 
be nudged to shape their behavior.  Fourth, the product was introduced in 2009. Thus, as 
researchers, we have sufficient data for our analysis. 
2.4.1 Overview of the Data Set 
Our dataset includes all transactions from this online grocer since its launch until 
December, 2013. There are in total around 100,000 orders placed by almost 18,000 users 
on around 40,000 product offerings (We cannot provide specific numbers because of 
confidentiality). The data consists of orders, order details, anonymized customer 
information, and product details.  For grass-fed beef, which is the focal product, the first 
order was placed in January 2009.  Our analysis only focuses on customer behavior 
transactions since that time.  
It turns out that the information about the nature of the products (whether it is 
meat, organic, etc.) had to be manually categorized in our dataset.  For this purpose, we 
recruited 15 students to do the classification on a list of grocery products and were paid 
$10 per hour for their effort. The list was prepared such that each product had 




concurred.  For those that did not have concurring results (4.82%), the product was 
classified based on the majority of inputs. If there was no majority, for example due to 
missing data, researchers’ input was used to determine the majority. 
2.4.2 Features Set for the Classifiers 
Consider t+1 as the time period over which we are interested in understanding a 
customer’s interests in purchasing the focal product. The categorical binary variable, i.e. 
the classifier label, is whether the customer purchased grass fed beef or not (1 if 
purchased, and -1 if not purchased yet). The feature set for the classifiers – independent 
of whether we use SVM, Logit, or KNN models – includes information from period t.  
One of the features is the purchase expenditure measured as the average dollar amount 
per order spent by the customer in t.  Another is the purchase count defined as the total 
number of orders placed by the customer in t.   
Table 2.1   Features for the Classifiers 
Variable Explanation We Measure: 
Meat 
type 
Affinity to different meat 
types, such as beef, pork, 
other red meat, poultry, 
seafood, other meat, dairy 
products, not meat 
the number of the corresponding meat type 
products purchased by a customer in 𝑡𝑡 
Organic Affinity to organic products 
the number of organic products purchased by a 
customer in 𝑡𝑡 
Non-
organic 
Affinity to non-organic 
products 
the number of non-organic products purchased by 
a customer in 𝑡𝑡 
Grass-
fed 
Affinity to grass-fed 
products 
the number of grass-fed products purchased by a 




Affinity to non-grass-fed 
products 
the number of non-grass-fed products purchased 
by a customer in 𝑡𝑡 
Price Average expenditure the average dollar amount spent in orders in 𝑡𝑡 





Some of the manually identified categories mentioned earlier are also considered 
as a part of the feature set.  As grass-fed beef is a form of red meat, we count the number 
of red meat purchases in t as a feature.  Given that grass-fed beef is viewed as being 
natural, we believe that customers’ affinity to organic products can also affect purchases.  
So, we include in the feature set the number of organic products purchased by a customer 
in t.  Simply keeping track of the number of organic products purchased may not truly 
capture the customer’s interest in grass-fed beef.   So, it is important to consider the 
proportion of organic products also.  Therefore, we account for it by including in the 
feature set the number of non-organic products purchased in t.  Grass-fed products are not 
limited to beef. There are other products available with grass-fed options, such as cheese, 
milk etc., The affinity towards such products is defined in the feature set as the number of 
other types of grass-fed products purchased. Table 2.1 summarizes features used in the 
classifiers (we cannot provide descriptive statistics because of confidentiality concerns 
but we have provided for a shorter duration in Table 2.2). 
2.5 Results and Discussion 
From a prediction standpoint, the online grocer is interested in planning for a 
three month period.  Such a timeframe accounts for seasonal variations in grocery 
shopping.  The question is: how long of a history do we analyze for predicting the 




2.5.1 Choosing the Training Window-Length 
An individual’s consumption pattern, with groceries in particular, is well-known 
to change across time.  Obviously, a longer history leads to non-stationarity of data but 
provides richer information because of the larger sample size.  So, choosing the window 
length involves a trade-off between non-stationarity and the sample size.  We evaluate 
how well different history window lengths – the previous three-, six-, nine-, or twelve-
months – are for predicting behaviors in the following three month period.  The metric 
for comparison is, among a certain number of M top predictions, how many purchase the 
product in subsequent test window of three months.  We also study the performance with 
respect to varying M (i.e., M = 100, 200 … 1000).  Note that we intend to use the best 
window from these choices when we conduct the subsequent analysis.  Since the window 
length may be different for different classifiers, we execute the same process for the 
classifiers we evaluate – SVM, Logit models and kNN. 
Because we have data between 2009 and 2013, we have 14 pairs of training and 
testing datasets, where the training window is three months.  The descriptive statistics of 
the features for one three month window (April, 2011 to June, 2011) are presented in 
Table 2.2. Specific numbers for purchase expenditure and frequency are not provided to 
maintain confidentiality. Also for the same reason, meat products are aggregated and one 







Table 2.2  Descriptive Statistics for a Typical Season 
 Mean Std Max Min Median 
Meat Products 2.43 3.71 36 0 1 
Dairy 2.22 3.58 26 0 1 
Not Meat (NM) 3.19 4.23 32 0 2 
Non-organic (NOrg) 5.70 7.36 57 0 3 
Organic (Org) 2.31 4.01 31 0 1 
Non-grassfed (NGF) 7.63 10.67 86 0 4 
Grass-fed (GF) 0.24 0.45 4 0 0 
Categorical Dependent Variable 0.22 0.41 1 0 0 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the average number of successes across the 14 pairs as M varies.  
Note that, for the SVM approach, the training period of 3 months generated the best 
predictions. We also performed same analysis for other methods but found the same 
three-month window to also be the best for kNN and Logit classifier models.  Therefore, 
we choose three months as the training window length for all subsequent analyses. 
 





As shown in Figure 2.2, our proposed SVM method appears to consistently 
perform better than other methods. In the lower range, logistic regression is better than 
kNN. However, kNN outperforms the logit model if we choose more than top 200. The 
effect of the value of k in kNN is not significant. Random selection as expected is the 
worst. We have not shown its performance in the figure as the number of successes is 
very small. In the following subsection, we explore in detail the results obtained using 
our (SVM-based) approach. 
 
Figure 2.2 Method Comparisons for Average Number of Success 
 
2.5.3 Evaluation of the SVM Approach without Active Nudging 
We are next interested in investigating how well the customers identified by our 




ahead can our approach identify customers who purchase the product; and (2) how 
frequent do those identified customers purchase the product thereafter? The objective of 
such analyses is to identify the value from nudging the customers to purchase earlier.  
Next, we define metrics for the analyses. 
2.5.3.1 Conversion Rate 
Recall that our SVM approach performs the estimation on a rolling window basis.  
Given the rolling window, this subsection characterizes a structured way of computing 
the conversion rate for customers identified by the SVM when there is no nudging.  
Suppose 𝑟𝑟 is the training-window index and 𝑠𝑠 indexes the future time-periods thereafter.  
Then, based on the top 1000 SVM predictions for the training window 𝑟𝑟, we can count 
the number of customers who actually bought the focal product between periods 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑟𝑟 
and denote it by𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, where 𝑠𝑠 > 𝑟𝑟. By re-indexing 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 such that 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑟𝑟, we obtain 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 
as the number of customers within the future 𝑡𝑡  periods identified by SVM when the 
training window is 𝑟𝑟.   
Figure 2.3 shows the variations with respect to 𝑡𝑡, the averages and variances of 
𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (An example of analysis in this section could be found at Appendix B). Observe that 
the variation is non-monotonic and one of the reasons is that the denominator to compute 
the averages is not the same.  When computing the average for large 𝑡𝑡 values, the number 
of available training windows is small and vice-versa.  An interesting aspect about the 
figure is that as much as 20% of the identified customers eventually purchase the product 
without any intervention by the retailer.  Also, observe that a large number of customers 




period marked along the x-axis corresponds to a three-month frame.  It appears from this 
analysis that both in terms of the number of customers as well as the time periods there 
appears to be significant advantage if the firm were to nudge.  
 
Figure 2.3  Means of Accumulative Number of Success in Lifetime Prediction 
 
2.5.3.2 Units Purchased by Converted Customers 
Instead of simply considering the number of customers who bought the focal 
product, we consider here the number of units of the focal product bought. Similar to the 
previous section, we denote 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 as the total number of units customers purchased the 
focal product in the future 𝑡𝑡 periods when the training window is 𝑟𝑟. The averages are 
computed as before.  Interestingly, in Figure 2.4, we find that the SVM-identified 
customers purchased the focal product 800 times. It appears that nudging is valuable for 





Figure 2.4 Means of Number of Repeat Purchases of Converted Customers in Lifetime 
 
2.5.4 Motivation for Nudging Customers to Convert Earlier 
According to analysis from previous subsections, we found that SVM-selected 
customers do not all immediately convert to purchase the product and it could take some 
of those top predicted customers two or three years to begin consuming this product.  
Conditional on a customer buying the product subsequent to a specific training window, 
we compute the average time before which the customer buys.1  In Figure 5, the blue line 
shows the average number of periods customers take to purchase for the various 𝑟𝑟. Note 
that the data is right censored.  It implies that the actual averages are larger than those in 
                                                 
1 Using the definition of 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  from Section 5.3.1, for a given time window 𝑟𝑟, we compute the 
average number of periods customers take to convert as  1
𝑇𝑇
∑ (𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟+1) − 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) ∗ (𝑡𝑡 + 1)𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟=1 , where 




the plots.  Even then, we observe that average time it takes to convert customers is as 
much as one year.   
Next, conditional on the customer purchasing the focal product in a period 
subsequent to a specific training window, we compute the average number of units 
purchased per customer.  In Figure 2.5, the dashed line shows the average number of 
units purchased by the customers as 𝑟𝑟 varies. The figure shows that the average number 
of grassfed beef purchases by the customers per period can be as high as 2 units. Again, 
as mentioned before, the data is right censored. 
 






2.6 The Field Experiment  
The previous section highlights the importance of expediting the purchase of the 
focal product. So, in this section, we conduct an experiment with the same objective.  The 
additional purpose of the experiment is also to validate the modified SVM technique we 
propose.  Recall that, unlike the traditional machine learning literature, our focus is not to 
evaluate Type I and II errors but to employ the Type I errors to nudge the customers.  The 
experiment offers the means to evaluate the nudging.  Fortunately, the same online 
grocery store evaluated was willing to conduct a field experiment to evaluate our 
proposed approach.  As Harrison and List (2004) point out, field experiments are ideal to 
study since subjects do not perceive any of the controls as they do in lab experiments.  
The following subsection details the experimental design. 
2.6.1 Experiment Design 
We gained access to run the experiment in January 2014.  So, we used winter 
2013 as the training data period to implement our modified SVM approach. Our SVM 
approach identified and rank ordered the top 1000 customers.  As a control group against 
which SVM will be evaluated, we randomly choose 1000 customers for nudging.  Note 
that such would be the policy if there was no clear way to rank order the customers.  
Within each group of 1000 customers, they are randomly assigned to one of the four 
information treatments: (a) Info_only, sending out emails including only information of 
grass-fed beef, such as nutritional values; (b) Low_Coupon, sending out emails including 
both information and a 25% off coupon; (c) High_Coupon, sending out both information 




shows the different information treatments as well as the number of customers assigned 
to each treatment within each group.  Note that the discounts are available only for 
purchase of the focal product and the coupons expired one week after the customer 
receives the coupons.  
The customers in each of the three information treatments were reached via an 
email.  The text within the email, except for the discount details, is identical so that the 
outcome differences can be attributed to the treatments.  The coupon was designed such 
that link within the email offered the coupon instead of an explicit code, which could 
have been shared in deal aggregator websites.  Also, it was indicated in that email that it 
was a limited-time offer valid for one week. 
Table 2.3  Experiment Design 
Name  Treatments Random group SVM group 
High_Coupon Send out information + high discount coupons 250 (R1) 250 (S1) 
Low_Coupon Send out information + low discount coupons 250 (R2) 250 (S2) 
Info_only Send out information 250 (R3) 250 (S3) 
NT No treatment 250 (R4) 250 (S4) 
 
2.6.2 Experiment Procedures 
After we selected the 1000 SVM- and the 1000 randomly-identified customers, 
we found some overlap across the two sets.  So, we continued to draw from the customer 
lists until we obtained 2000 unique customers. 250 customers are randomly selected from 




from January 13 to 26. In order to increase customers’ engagement, emails are sent to 
each customer a day before the time they usually get their order. The last date a user 
would be able to use the coupon was February 2. 
2.6.3 Analysis and Discussion 
In this section, we present the results of the experiment. We first focus on the 
aggregate performance comparisons among different techniques, followed by a 
discussion about the impact of different treatments, and some final analysis on the nature 
of customer behaviors on outcomes. 
We study the impact of the treatments as of April 2, 2014.  All transactions from 
January 13 to April 2, 2014 are used for the analysis.  In that timeframe, 1680 customers 
purchased the product.  Of them, 988 are first-time purchasers and the rest of them had 
repeatedly purchased the product. Of the first-time purchasers, 235 (24%) have 
previously shopped here.  
Table 2.4 Method comparisons of Conversion Rates 
 SVM Logit Random 
Active nudging (Treatment groups) * 16.75% 10.28% 7.14% 
Natural progression (No Treatment) 6.80% 2.45% 1.60% 
 
Table 2.4 characterizes how customers converted under different treatments.  
Note that, the number of customers who converted to purchasing the product is 
significantly better under our approach than the random selection (6.8% versus 1.6%). To 




was sent but restrict our attention only to subjects whom we have tracked as having 
opened the email. 2, 3  Even among those customers, responses are significantly better 
under our approach.  Further, the information treatments were better than the no 
information treatment.  Thus, the table provides evidence that customers are not only 
better identified by our approach but also they are also more likely to be nudged. 
Interestingly, around 30% (68) of the 235 customers who purchased in the quarter were 
also subjects in our information treatments4. 
Table 2.5 Descriptive Numbers of Logit list Overlapped with SVM and Random 
  SVM Random Total  SVM Random Total 
High Coupon 146 7 153 Q1 206 7 213 
Low Coupon 156 12 168 Q2 153 12 165 
Information 149 8 157 Q3 172 8 180 
NT 151 16 167 Q4 74 16 90 
 
Our experimental design considered only our approach and the random selection.  
However, we are also interested in understanding how our approach compares against the 
Logit-based one.  We used the intersection of the top 1000 ranked customers from the 
Logit approach and the 2000 subjects in our experiment.  We found 648 such customers – 
                                                 
2 Email is in general recognized as a poor marketing campaign approach due to its low open rates from 
customers (http://www.smartinsights.com/email-marketing/email-communications-strategy/statistics-
sources-for-email-marketing/). Fortunately, we have the ability to track the opening of the email using the 
software that the company uses to manage the campaigns.  This allows us to focus on consumers 
conditional on opening the email.  
3 In some cases, when consumers scroll down in their inboxes, the emails may get “opened” even if they 
have not been actively read upon.  So, our measures are only conservative.  
4 We examined the weighted average number of previous orders for customers (i.e. the number in the 
following parentheses) in different rank ranges: top 1000 (10.9), top 1000-5000 (3.88), beyond top 5000 
(2.83). We found that the missing 70% are mostly customers with fewer purchase experience and we do not 
have enough information to learn and predict their behaviors. This is consistent with the cold start problem 




605 of them overlapped with the SVM-based approach and the rest with the random 
selection.  Note from Table 2.5 that the number of subjects in each treatment is roughly 
the same across both Logit and SVM.  From a rank standpoint, again as expected, there is 
a larger overlap with the top 250-ranked customers (Q1), the next 250 (Q2), the next 250 
(Q3), and the final 250 (Q4).  Even then, we find that overall SVM does better than the 
Logit model in terms of the effectiveness of nudging conditional on customers opening 
the emails (10.45% versus 16.45%).  Extrapolating our observations we conclude that 
even if there will be no differences with respect to the subjects in the various treatments, 
our approach appears to perform better than the Logit-based model. In Chapter 4, we 
further analyze the behaviors of customers identified by our approach when they are 
subjected to the different information treatments.  
2.7 Conclusions and Implications 
This paper investigates how, when dealing with products that are available in 
limited quantities but may still exceed the current demand, customers may be nudged to 
purchase them. Specifically, our main problem is to generate a rank order list of 
customers to be nudged to purchase the product.  Existing recommender system 
techniques do not typically deal with generating such a list. Accordingly, we developed a 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) based approach that allows us to rank order customers 
based on their propensity to purchase the product.  
Without any nudges, we first evaluated how well our SVM based approach 
performs compared to standard ones (such as logit regression, kNN etc.) in predicting 




historical transaction data from an online grocery store. We find that up to 20% of the top 
predictions from SVM eventually become consumers who subsequently purchase the 
product.  This measure is found to be significantly better than existing standard 
techniques. It surprisingly turns out that our approach can predict the purchasing 
consumer one year ahead when it happened in reality.  This motivated us to consider 
active nudging strategies that we implement with an experiment.   
In the experiment, we subject customers to information versus coupons treatments 
and analyze the differences in their behaviors. We find that, as before, our SVM based 
approach performed better than other techniques.  In summary, our work relates to 
various domains.  As mentioned earlier, traditional supply chain models focus on 
optimizations assuming exogenous customers’ demand.  Our paper allows for taking into 
account behavioral aspects of customers when dealing with supply chain constraints. Our 
work also contributes to the predictive analytics and recommender system literature. We, 
to our best knowledge, are the first to propose a recommender system for products 
available in limited quantities. One of the salient features of our technique is that we 
identify customers marked as Type I errors as the ones to be nudged.  In line with that, 
we rank order potential customers for nudging. Our analysis is also distinctive in the 
manner in which we use the experiments.  Also, our results from the experiments are 
useful actionable insights. 
There are some limitations in our research. Firstly, features used in training our 
SVM approach are limited. Due to privacy issues, we do not have access to customers’ 




grocery context. If we had access to data from other contexts, the applicability of our 
approach can be better investigated.  
In the future, we would like to develop a model to further investigate how 
information and coupons interact with different types of potential customers. This would 
offer more insights regarding how to strategically leverage different strategies to nudge 
potential customers to purchase and subscribe to the product. More personalized nudging 




CHAPTER 3. AN ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVE STRUCTURE IN 
COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY: AN APPLICATION TO 
CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM 
3.1 Introduction 
The collaborative economy – which includes firms like Airbnb, Kickstarter, Uber, 
etc. – continues to grow at a staggering 25% pace annually (Forbes, 2013).  According to 
an article in MIT Sloan Expert, collaborative consumption is a $110 billion market (Sloan, 
2013).  A crucial aspect to the functioning of these collaborative economies is the 
incentive structure that encourages participation.  For example, Uber dynamically 
changes the rates depending on the demand and supply of Uber cars in specific regions. 
Kickstarter, on the other hand, gives the leeway to the project creators to offer incentives 
to project backers so as to raise money for projects.  While there are different forms of 
incentive structures that exist, the objective in this paper is to use the structural modeling 
approach to study one form of it. 
Generally speaking, there are two forms of incentive structures in these 
collaborative economies: one where a non-monetary resource may be shared and the 
provider gains monetary incentives (e.g., Uber); and the other where money is the shared 
resource and the providers obtain benefits (including the psychological satisfaction) from 
the projects (e.g., Kickstarter). Prior research has studied the dynamic pricing model in 




In this paper, we focus on the latter kind of incentive structure. In those cases, because 
the rewards are non-monetary, often a menu of options is provided. Also, because these 
are non-monetary rewards, they are subject to information asymmetry issues.  
Furthermore, as in Kickstarter.com, creators are allowed to dynamically change across 
time the project reward structure (PRS), including the number of reward levels, their 
denominations, reward types, and maximum number of backers for some rewards. So, the 
information asymmetry and the levels of rewards offered create interesting tensions that 
have implications on whether the project is successfully funded. The objective of our 
research is to understand the impact of PRS on backers’ pledging decisions during 
projects’ funding period. Specifically, we analyze a project panel data to investigate the 
following questions. Firstly, how do various features of the PRS impact backers’ 
pledging decisions and how is the nature of the impact contingent on other project 
features? Secondly, when and how should creators strategically modify the PRS during 
the funding period to attract more backers?  
To motivate the structural analysis, we first present a project-level reduced-form 
model to investigate the impact of the reward structure on project outcomes. We find that 
dynamically modifying reward structures during project funding process has significantly 
positive impacts on influencing the project outcomes. We then develop a structural model 
to investigate how reward structures affect the reward-level decision making process by 
using a panel data. We find that reward levels that have been popular options till date or 
that have gained recent popularity are perceived to be more favorable if they are pushed 




options ahead of them in the menu. Thus we provide insights into how project creators 
can strategically design PRS.  
Understanding this mechanism is of significant importance to both industry 
practitioners and academic researchers. On one hand, our research could shed light on 
how to leverage non-monetary incentives to distract users’ attention to risks and get them 
actively engaged in collaborative community. Also the findings could provide some 
guidelines for project creators to strategically design the reward mechanism in a more 
efficient way. On the other hand, our research extends previous research on how private 
incentives work and also contributes to the rapidly increasing literature on collaborative 
economy and crowdfunding.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we review 
relevant literature in incentive design in collaborative economy, crowdfunding studies, 
and product line design theory in marketing. Section 3.3 describes the research context 
and data collection details. In Section 3.4, we present results from the reduced form logit 
regression analysis. Following that, Section 3.5 describes the structural model to 
understand the impact of PRS on contribution patterns. To account for endogeneity issues, 
we further present a model in Section 3.6. Empirical results are shown in Section 3.7. The 
counterfactual market simulations are presented subsequently. We conclude this paper 




3.2 Literature Review 
Our study points to three streams of literature: (1) incentive design in 
collaborative economy; (2) crowdfunding research in management; and (3) product line 
design in marketing. 
 
3.2.1 Incentive Design in Collaborative Economy 
In the collaborative economy, incentives are crucial for encouraging participation. 
Edelman and Luca (2013) study the dynamic pricing model on Airbnb.com and suggest 
the digital discrimination in online marketplaces. Meanwhile, crowdfunding is similar to 
the single threshold public good in the sense that people’s monetary contributions need to 
collectively achieve a threshold to make this project successfully funded. Prior research 
has investigated mechanisms that facilitate coordination among subjects’ contributions to 
alleviate free riding behaviors. Coordination mechanisms generally include, but are not 
limited to: communication, threat of punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002), anonymity vs. 
identifiability (e.g. a type of reputation), information (Hashim et al., 2012), and private 
incentives (e.g. a centrally provided lottery ticket for every contribution) (Fuster and 
Meier, 2010). Gneezy et al. (2011) further propose that the discussion should focus on 
when and why incentives do and do not work (Gneezy et al., 2011). The analysis that we 
conduct in our paper corresponds to the use of menu of non-monetary rewards as the 




3.2.2 Crowdfunding Research in Management Studies 
Prior crowdfunding studies examine users’ contribution patterns. For example, 
rational herding behaviors have been observed in Prosper.com, a lending-based platform 
(Herzenstein et al., 2011; Zhang and Liu, 2012). Burtch et al. (2013) find that crowding 
out may occur where contributors may experience a decrease in marginal utility from 
making a contribution as it becomes less important to the recipient in digitalism 
crowdfunding (Burtch et al., 2013).  
Scholars also look into how to alleviate the information asymmetry in those 
crowdfunding platforms. For example, Lin et al. (2012) show that online friendship of 
borrowers could serve as signals of credit quality of borrowers on Prosper.com (Lin et al., 
2012). Ghasemkhani et al. (2012) further empirically investigate the role of information 
systems in alleviating adverse selection through information availability in a P2P lending 
market (Ghasemkhani et al., 2013). However, to our best knowledge, there has been little 
research on investigating how non-monetary incentives alleviate risk and encourage 
participation on reward-based crowdfunding platforms. 
3.2.3 Product Line Design in Marketing Research 
A lot of studies examine how companies manage the product line by choosing the 
length and the variety of the product line in marketing. We borrow theories in this area to 
deepen our understanding of the reward structure including the length of the rewards and 
types of rewards. Firms may compete through their product lines vertically and 




attract customers of different willingness-to-pay for quality. Second, many firms may 
offer products that are different in characteristics such as flavor, color, or scent.  
Additionally, product line design is treated a competitive tool to compete with 
other companies or products (Draganska and Jain, 2005). They also find that consumers 
value product-line characterisitcs, such as quality and price, more than horizontal 
characteristics (Draganska and Jain, 2006). To our best knowledge, our study is the first 
one to bring the perspective of product line design into studying the reward structure 
design of crowdfunding platforms. 
3.3 Research Context and Data Collection 
The reward-based crowdfunding platform we study is Kickstarter.com, one of the 
largest crowdfunding websites. Kickstarter is aiming at funding creative projects, ranging 
from films, music, comics and dance, to video games, food-related projects and 
technology products. It has 13 different categories and 50 subcategories. Depending on 
the role, the set of tasks are different. A campaigner needs to create a project, specify the 
amount to raise, create the reward structure for the backers and decide the funding raising 
duration. As a contributor, you go through different reward levels, decide which level to 
contribute to and make a pledge. The funding mechanism is called fixed funding 
campaign, or “all or nothing”. The project gets funded only if it achieves or exceeds the 
goal; otherwise, money is refunded. More importantly, the reward, will be delivered only 
if the project is successfully funded. 
We collected a panel data set from this website from March to July 2013 using a 




information about the funding status, the reward structure, comments related to the 
project, and backers for each project. We have the data for all 13 categories. In the 
preliminary analysis, we choose games and films categories as the sample to facilitate the 
estimation process in the current empirical application. Games and films are among the 
top five most popular categories in terms of the number of projects launched and the top 
two popular categories in terms of the total amount of dollar donations as of August, 
2014. The descriptive statistics are outlined in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Kickstarter Projects 
 
On the reward menu, the reward options are typically sorted in ascending order 
based on the dollar value of the reward level. In terms of the reward descriptions, the 
creator could offer backers different types of rewards. Backers’ valuations toward those 
rewards could affect their pledging decisions. Therefore, we manually categorized reward 
descriptions and created several reward category variables for our model. Here are the 
reward categories: (1) Decorative item related to the project, such as poster, sticker, 
painting etc.; (2) In-kind item related to the project, such as shirt, mug, bag etc.; (3) 
Variable Mean Min Max 
Project Success (1 = Success) 0.44 0 1 
Project Duration 32.12 1 60 
Project Goal (in $) 37656.22 1 10000000 
# Reward Level Options in a Project 9.79 1 79 
Total #Backers for a Project 136.75 0 66724.5 




Tickets for early access to the product; (4) Contributor acknowledgement, such as name 
shown on the contributor list etc.; (5) Gratitude, such as sending out “Thank you 
“ message; (6) product samples, such as a DVD of games; (7) backer engagement, such 
as personal conversations with the creator, participating in designing the product etc.; (8) 
other reward categories who do not follow in previous rewards. A sample of reward 
descriptions for a project has been offered in Appendix E. As you could see in the 
example, our current categorization mainly focuses on classifying the rewards into 
different categories. We do not consider differentiating the quantity differences in certain 
categories. 
The categorization process works as follows. Firstly, we collected all the reward 
description data in a file and ran a word frequency analysis. Among the top 200 high 
frequent words, we identified 20 meaningful words. Secondly, based on the meaningful 
word list, two of the authors manually coded around 500 reward descriptions and 
completed the keyword list of different reward categories. Thirdly, according the 
keyword list, we programmed to accomplish the major part of the coding. However, for 
some of the reward descriptions, it could not be corrected categorized. The reason is that 
among some reward levels, the creator tries to employ an accumulative reward design 
method. For example, they will provide “all previous rewards” from a lower reward level 
in a higher reward level. Therefore, one of the researchers coded the rest of the reward 
descriptions according to the keyword list.  
To facilitate our estimation, we choose a representative sample (25%) from the 
films and games category proportionally with 500 projects in films and 200 in games, 




Facebook connection on the project campaign page. And 37 projects have missing data 
on reward description due to missing data problem in our data collection process. Besides, 
we remove projects that have 0 backers on any given day. The final data for estimation 
include 313 projects (218 projects in film category and 95 projects in games category). 
Even though the number of projects in the estimation is not huge, we use the daily reward 
level data of each project and the data points used in the following estimation is 
sufficiently rich. 
3.4 Reduced-Form Analysis  
Before we present the analysis from the structural model, we firstly describe the 
reduced form analysis in understanding the effects of PRS on the funding outcome at the 
project level. Insights from this analysis motivate our structural analysis in section 5.  
We use binary logit regression for the reduced-form analysis. The prediction 
variable is 1 if the project got successfully funded and 0 otherwise. The predictor 
variables include creator-related features, project-related features and interaction between 
backers and creators. Two main variables related to PRS are: (1) numRewards, which 
indicates the number of reward options for each project; and (2) rewardDummy, which 
represents if the number of rewards were modified by project creators during the funding 
collection period. As mentioned before, data for this reduced-form analysis is from 
Games, and Film categories.  
The preliminary analysis of project funding data revealed two key insights about 
the PRS: (a) Projects that offer more reward level choices are more likely to succeed; and 




likely to succeed. Results are presented in table 3.2. The significantly positive impact of 
PRS in the reduced form regression motivates us to develop a structural model to under 
backers’ dynamic decision process based on a panel data. 
Table 3.2 Estimation Results of Preliminary Analysis 
Variable Parameter Estimate* Standard Error 
Intercept 0.0299 0.1172 
Games - Dummy -0.4092 0.0752 
Project Duration -0.0258 0.00330 
Project Goal (in $) -6.85E-6 9.046E-7 
# Reward Level Options 0.0523 0.00675 
Reward Menu Changed (Y = 1) 1.0081 0.0809 
* Parameter estimates in bold letters are significant at least at the 99.9% confidence level. 
 
3.5 A Structural Model of Backers’ Learning and Pledging Decisions 
We develop a structural model of “Backers’ Learning and Pledging Decisions”. 
We consider potential backers’ daily decisions of whether to back a particular project and 
which reward level to choose from the available options in the PRS.  The model 
incorporates the dynamic structure of the PRS, as well as the observable and 
unobservable (to the researcher) features at the project level and the reward level. 
Historical daily funding data for every reward level of a representative sample of projects 
will be used to facilitate the estimation of and the inference for this model (in the current 




3.5.1 Model Specification 
Let jT  denote the project duration (in days) of project j  (j = 1, 2,…, J) and let jtR  
denote the number of reward level options available to backers in project 𝑗𝑗’s rewards 
menu at time 𝑡𝑡. The indirect utility for a backer from donating in reward level r  ( r  = 1, 2, 
…, jtR ) of project j  (j = 1, 2,…, J) at time t  (t = 1, 2, …, jT ) is specified as: 
( )rjt j rjt r rjtu f Q X Pα β ε= + − +   (1) 
where, jQ  is the latent quality or attractiveness of project j  which is not 
explained by the observable project characteristics. ( )jf Q is a function through which 
the project quality enters the utility function. rjtX  are observable reward and project-
level characteristics that include both time-variant as well as time-invariant features that 
are observed by the researcher as well as the backers. rP  is the dollar value or donation 
amount of the reward. Finally, rjtε  is a mean-zero random shock that captures the effect 
of unobserved (to the researcher) reward-level features that may influence potential 
backers’ choice of specific reward levels in project j .  
We assume that backers do not know the true quality of a project perfectly. That 
is, they have uncertainty about the true quality, jQ . Due to this uncertainty, backers’ 
belief about the true quality of project j  at time t is stochastic. Hence, in Equation (1), we 
replace jQ  with jtQ , which is backers’ belief about the true quality of project j  at time t. 




We allow that backers may be risk averse with respect to the uncertainty in the 
quality belief. Specifically, we assume that ( )jtf Q  takes the CARA form: 
( ) ( )expjt j jtf Q Qρ= − −     (2) 
where, jρ  is the level of risk aversion of backers of project j . Backers of project 
j  are risk averse if 0jρ > , risk neutral if 0jρ = , and risk seeking if 0jρ < .  If a 
project creator can attract several of his or her friends and acquaintances to back the 
project, then such backers may have a lower level of risk aversion. Hence, we allow the 
level of risk aversion of backers to be project specific. In particular, we allow the risk 
aversion level of backers of a project to depend on the size of the social network of the 
project creator. Specifically, the size of the creator’s social network on Facebook: 
( )0 1 ln 1 #j FBfriendsρ ρ ρ= + +                               (3) 
Due to their uncertainty about project quality, backers choose the pledging 
decision that maximizes their expected utility: 
  ( )rjt jt rjt r rjtE u E f Q X Pα β ε   = + − +     (4) 
The expected utility from not donating in the project at time t  is specified as:  
0 0t tu ε=                  (5) 
3.5.2 Learning about Project Quality 
In any period, t , backers face uncertainty about the project quality. This 




project j . We assume that backers’ prior beliefs should be right on average about the true 
quality of a project. That is, backers have rational expectations such that the mean of 
their prior belief is the true quality of the project. This assumption is standard in many 
learning models (Coscelli and Shum, 2004), and is made to address the infeasibility of 
identifying the risk aversion parameter separately from the prior mean. The prior belief is 
assumed to be a normal distribution:  
( )20 0~ ,j jQ N Q σ     (6) 
With aggregate data on backers’ pledging decisions, we cannot identify the prior 
variance, 20σ . Thus, similar to many learning models (Narayanan et al., 2005) we fix the 
initial prior variance to one.  
In each period, backers update their belief about the quality of project j  based on 
the signals they receive through the status of the existing number of backers in the 
various reward levels of the project. We also assume that backers do not track reward 
level status daily over the project duration. Hence, at any time t ,  backers have the same 
prior belief shown above, and they only use information about reward level status at time 
t  to update their belief.  
Suppose there are 1rjtB −  backers that have donated in reward level r  of project j  
until time t 1− . We assume that this reward status generates an unobserved (to the 
researcher) signal, rjts , that is normally distributed with mean equal to the true project 















     (7) 





− , increases with the number of existing 
backers for that reward level. We also allow the precision of the signal to depend on the 
dollar value of the reward level, rP : 
( )( )2 0 1exp lnr rPσ γ γ= +    (8) 
A negative value for 1γ  would indicate that, controlling for the number of 
backers in the reward levels, the precision of the signals is greater for the reward levels of 
higher dollar value. 
Backers are assumed to update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner. That is, they 
combine their prior belief about project quality with the quality signals from the jtR  
reward levels and apply Bayes Rule to form the posterior belief. As the prior belief and 
the signals are normally distributed, the posterior belief is also a normal distribution and 
is given by: 
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Note that the signals, rjts , are known to backers but are unobserved by the 
researcher. Hence, the mean of the posterior belief, jtQ , is a stochastic variable from the 
point of view of the researcher. Since the signals are assumed to have normal 
distributions, it follows that jtQ  is also a normal variable. In particular, by substituting 
Equation (7) in Equation (10), we can derive the following: 


















=∑    (13) 
Given that the quality belief in any period is a normal distribution with mean jtQ  
and variance 2
jtQ
σ , we can rewrite the expected utility of backers (Equation 4) as follows: 
21exp
2 jtrjt j j jt j Q rjt r rjt
E u Q X Pρ η ρ σ α β ε    = − − + − + − +      
       (14) 
We will use the following equivalent form for the expected utility: 
21
2 jtrjt j jt j Q rjt r rjt






Let the market size of backers be denoted by M. We assume a sufficiently large 
size of potential backers (M = 10,000). If we assume that the unobserved shocks, ε , 
follow an i.i.d. Type I extreme value distribution, then backers’ probability of not 
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 Hence, we get the following expression: 
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∑ ∑ ∑              (17) 
In the first period ( t 1= ) when backers make their decision based on only the 
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       = − − − − − −                   
∑ ∑ ∑ (18) 
We assume that the project qualities, jQ , follow a normal distribution that is 













jt kjt kjt kjt k j j Q
k k k
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= = =
       = − − − − − −                   
∑ ∑ ∑   (19) 
Now, conditional on jQ  and jtη , for those who donate in project j , we have the 
following conditional probability of choosing reward level r :  





















                     (20) 
We use Maximum Likelihood Estimation to estimate the model parameters Θ . 
The parameters to be estimated include the utility function parameters ( ,α β  in Equation 
1), risk aversion parameters ( 0 1,ρ ρ  in Equation 3), quality signal parameters ( 0 1,γ γ  in 
Equation 8), and the normal distribution parameters for the quality of projects in each 
category ( , , 1, 2,..C C Cµ σ = ). Hence,  ( ) ( ) ( ){ }0 1 0 1, , , , , , ,C Cα β ρ ρ γ γ µ σΘ = .  
For a random sample of J  projects, the likelihood function is given by: 
( )
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where ( ), ,j C CQφ µ σ  is the p.d.f. of the normal distribution of project quality when the 



















∑  is the p.d.f. of the normal distribution in 
Equation (13), and the last term is the conditional likelihood of the observed number of 
backers across the various reward levels of the project. 
One issue with the above likelihood function is that, relative to the number of 
backers for a project, the potential market size ( M ), tends to be a large number for most 
projects. This can result in very small standard errors of the parameter estimates in the 
maximum likelihood procedure.  Hence, we adjust the likelihood function in order that 
the standard errors are not influenced by the size of the potential market size. A similar 
idea of adjusting the likelihood function was also used in prior research (Song and 
Chintagunta, 2003). Consequently, we minimize the following ‘scaled’ negative log-
likelihood function in the estimation: 
3.6 Correct Endogeneity Issues 
As our interests lie in analyzing the impact of changing the reward structure on 
backers’ behaviors, one potential issue is that the data we observe is already a reflection 
of project creators’ strategic behaviors. In other words, creators’ behaviors are 
endogenously generated and it is not fair to just model the backer-side’s behaviors. To 
resolve this concern, we endogenize creators’ decisions in our model. Specifically, we 
correct endogeneity for creators’ decision to adjust the number of reward options in the 




We model creators’ decision jty  as changing the number of reward options at a 
given day t for project j. jty  is a discrete ordinal decision variable. If jty  is a negative 
integer, it means removing the corresponding number of reward options. If jty  is 0, it 
means the creator does not make any change to the number of reward options. If jty  is a 
positive integer, it means adding the corresponding number of reward options.  
We use ordered probit model to model creators’ decisions. The assumption is that 
there is a continuous latent metric 
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 < ≤=  < ≤
 >
                                (22) 
where, (k 0,1,2)kν = are thresholds that partition the latent utility into a series of 
regions corresponding to the various ordinal categories. In our data, we labeled removing 
number of rewards as 1jty = − , making no changes as 0jty = , adding one reward as 
1jty =  and adding more than one reward as 2jty = .  
We allow for endogeneity in the latent metric. In order to do this, we specify the 
latent utility of creators of project j  at time t  as: 
*




where jtY are observable project-level characteristics that are observed by the researcher 
as well as the creator and affect the latent utility of the creator. jtξ are mean-zero random 
shock that are unobserved (to the researcher) and affect creators’ latent utility, where 
      
2(0, )
jtjt
N ξξ σ                                            (24) 
jtY serves as instruments that are uncorrelated with jtξ . We model there is a 
correlation ω  between jtξ  and jtη (in equation 12).  
                                     ( , )jt jtcorrω ξ η=                                   (25) 
Therefore, given jtη , the conditional probability of |jt jtξ η  is  a normally 
distributed random variable which has the following distribution. 
 
2 2| ( , (1 ))jt
jt
jt




ξ η ω η σ ω
σ
−            (26) 
The method we model endogeneity is known as the “limited information” 
approach, which has been used in prior literature (Villas-Boas and Winer 1999; Nair 
2007). There are three reasons why we need to model creators’ behaviors in this way: (a) 
in the crowdfunding context, we are not sure about the objective function of the project 
creator. Therefore, we could not simply assume that they are to maximize the total 
pledged amount or total number of backers for the project; (b) even if we are aware of the 
objective function of the project creator, imposing function forms would bias our 
estimation; (c) our primary goal is to make recommendations for the reward structure 
change, which would not be possible if restrictions from the optimal structure design is 
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       (27) 
Where, φ is the p.d.f of |jt jtξ η  in equation 26.  
Estimation of models involving ordered probit model will not result in a unique 
solution. For identification purpose, we impose some identification constraints. We 
normalized the variance of jtξ as 1, which implies
2 1
jtξ
σ = . And we normalize one of the 
threshold as 0, 0 0ν = . Therefore, in addition to the parameters that need to be estimated
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0 1 0 1, , , , , , ,C Cα β ρ ρ γ γ µ σΘ = , we also need to estimate the parameters in the 
latent utility function ( 0 1,τ τ  in equation 23), the correlation parameter (ω  in equation 25), 
and the thresholds in the ordered probit model ( 1 2,ν ν  in equation 27). Thus, all 
parameters that need to be estimated are 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0 1 0 1 0 1 1 2, , , , , , , , ( , ), ( , ),C Cα β ρ ρ γ γ µ σ τ τ ν ν ωΘ = . 
We also use the MLE approach to estimate the parameters. The likelihood 
function – equation 21a become as follows: 
( )
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where mjtI  is an indicator variable that denotes the decision m (m=-1, 0, 1, 2) the creator 
of project j made at time t . 
 The scaled log-likelihood function – equation 21b will become as follows: 
( )( )
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  (28b) 
3.7 Estimation Results 
In this section, we first present the estimation results after we correct the 
endogeneity issues, and then discuss the major differences of results before and after we 
account for the endogeneity issues.  
3.7.1 Results after Correcting Endgoeneity Issues 
Based on the AIC/BIC criterion, we reported estimation results of the following 
structural model, which are shown in Table 3.3. First, we look at the results for the 
backers’ behaviors. Among the project level variables, we find that most backers prefer 
to not donate in projects in the Game and Film categories when compared with the 
outside option. This is inferred from the large negative means of project qualities in these 








backers (M = 10,000). Hence, given the large market size, vast majority of the backers 
prefer not to donate in an individual project.  
From the estimates of the parameters corresponding to the variance of quality 
signals from reward levels, we can infer that, controlling for the number of backers in the 
reward levels, the precision of the signal is greater for the reward levels with lower dollar 
value ( 1γ  = 0.5465). In other words, when backers donate into lower dollar value rewards 
it gives a more precise signal of the project quality. One possible explanation is that the 
content of reward levels with lower dollar value is typically more generic tastes while 
that of reward levels with higher ones is more unique tastes. Therefore, backers would 
perceive a higher precision signal from reward levels with lower dollar value.  
From the estimates of the parameters corresponding to the level of risk aversion 
of backers of particular projects, we see that backers are generally risk averse ( 0ρ  = 
2.2222). However, project creators that have larger social networks on Facebook are able 
to attract backers to their projects that are less risk averse ( 1ρ  = -0.4054). One 
explanation could be that many of those backer may be friends of the creator who are less 
risk averse to donating in his or her project despite the uncertainty of the project quality.  
Next, among the coefficients for the project and reward level variables, we find 
that more popular projects that have managed to garner large amounts of donations till 
date continue to attract more backers (coefficient value of 0.7394). However, the 
percentage of the Goal reached till date acts oppositely (coefficient value of -0.1036).  
Next, we focus on the PRS to see how the project reward structure influences 




likely to donate in higher dollar value reward levels (coefficient of rP  =1.4052). Next, 
we see that controlling for everything else, backers are less likely to donate in a project 
with more reward level options (coefficient value of -2.1025). To the extent that higher 
dollar value reward levels tend to be lower down in the menu of rewards options, we also 
find that the reward levels that are further down the menu tend to be less popular 
(coefficient of r_loxn =-0.2667). But interestingly, reward levels that have been popular 
options till date (i.e., high 1rjtB − ) are perceived to be even more favorable if they are 
pushed lower down the menu of options (coefficient of 1rjtB −  * r_loxn =0.0763), 
presumably by introducing weaker or less attractive options ahead of them in the menu. 
Hence, while the early preliminary analysis suggested that a change in the PRS over the 
course of the project duration increases the odds of success for a project, here we see that 
project creators need to be strategic about changing the PRS. In particular, the 
attractiveness of popular reward levels can be further improved by introducing new 
reward level options above them. This finding is one of our most important contributions 
to the existing literature on sharing economy. Different from Burtch et al. (2013), we find 
creators could strategically design their incentives to attract backers at the reward level.  
This change in the attractiveness of certain reward options due to a change in the 
PRS may be explained by the Contrast Principle or the theory of Context-dependent 
preferences in the Consumer Behavior Theory literature (Tversky and Simonson, 1993). 
According to these theories, consumers are more comfortable comparing and contrasting 
between more similar alternatives, and the relative attractiveness of an alternative can be 




by the behavioral theory.  As reward levels that are further down the menu tend to be less 
popular, it is reasonable that the placement of a new incentive alternative should be above 
an already popular reward level rather than below.  Further investigation can reveal 
whether cognitive theories of consumer choice behavior such as the Contrast Principle or 
Construal Level Theory (Trope et al., 2007) can indeed play a crucial role in the 
successful dynamic design of the PRS.  
Besides, creators also need to pay attention to the content of the reward. We find 
that rewards that include Product Samples such as, say, a game DVD, are most attractive 
for backers (Coefficient value of 0.8336). Other reward types such as Decorative Items 
(e.g., posters and stickers) Unique or special reward types, and Backers’ Engagement in 
Product Creation (e.g., participating in designing the product), Contributor 
Acknowledgement (e.g., name shown on the contributor list) are also fairly valuable 
propositions for backers (positive coefficients of 0.2404, 0.1915, and 0.1263, 
respectively). Rewards that include tickets for a one-time event or simple expressions of 
gratitude, such as “Thank you” messages, are the least attractive among all reward types, 
presumably because they elicit very low engagement with the project and therefore the 
backers are not attracted by those reward options.  
In this part, we look at results of the creator side after we correct the endogeneity 
issue. There exists endogeneity between creators’ decision to change the number of 
reward options and backers’ behaviors (positive significant correlation estimate, 0.1159).  
Among the project level variables that affect creators’ latent utility, we find that 
the higher number of barren rewards in the reward menu, the less likely the creator is to 




proportion of barren rewards in the reward menu, the less likely the creator is to add 
reward options (the negative coefficient of -0.6084).  
The thresholds for the latent utility of the creator are estimated to be 5.6277 and 
6.1012, which are both statistically significant.  







Gameµ  -7.5286 0.976 
Filmµ  -8.2498 1.0283 
2
Gameσ  0.7664 0.1034 
2
Filmσ  0.8959 0.127 
Risk Aversion  
0ρ  2.2222 0.2542 
1ρ (Coeff. of ln(1 + #FB 
friends) 
-0.4054 0.0393 
Variance of Quality 
Signal from Reward 
Levels 
0γ  -1.8693 0.4046 
1γ (Coeff. of rP ) 0.5465 0.12 
Project and Reward Level Variables (Xrjt)   
Log(1+ # Projects backed by creator) 0.0708 0.1302 
Log(1+Donation till date in $) 0.7394 0.041 
%Goal Reached till date -0.1036 0.0111 











t_squared -0.0195 0.022 
I(t = Day1, Day2, Day3) -0.1747 0.1089 
I(t = Day Tj-2, Day Tj-1, Day Tj) 0.1738 0.0938 
Log(1+ # Options in Rewards Menu) -2.1025 0.242 
# Total backers (in 100s) till previous period in 
reward level r ( )1rjtB −  
-0.0014 0.0024 
Location of reward level r in Rewards Menu 
(r_loxn) 
-0.2667 0.003 
1rjtB −  * r_loxn 0.0763 0.0012 












I (Decorative Item = Poster, Sticker, 
Painting, etc.) 
0.2515 0.0149 
I (In-Kind Item = Shirt, Mug, Bag, 
etc.) 
0.0258 0.0201 
I (Tickets for early access to product) -0.2052 0.03 
I (Contributor Acknowledgement) -0.0398 0.0166 
I (Gratitude = Signed / Thank You 
message) 
-0.4154 0.0142 
I (Product Samples like DVD) 0.8606 0.0165 
I (Backer Engagement in Product 
creation) 
0.1326 0.0276 
I (Other or Unique Reward Types) 0.2195 0.0174 










Creator side Variables (Yjt)   
Correlation parameter 0.1159 0.0038 
Constant parameter (𝜏𝜏0) 3.5697 0.1469 
Number of barren rewards 0.0406 0.0139 
Proportion of number of barren rewards -0.6084 0.2304 
Threshold 1 in ordered probit model (𝜈𝜈1) 5.6277 0.1348 
Threshold 2 in ordered probit model (𝜈𝜈2) 6.1012 0.5801 
* Parameter estimates in bold letters are significant at least at the 95% confidence level. 
3.7.2 Comparison of Results Before and After Correcting Endogeneity 
For most of the parameter estimates, the estimates do not change much under 
models before and after correcting endogeneity. However, there is a huge change for the 
variable we correct endogeneity, namely, the number of reward options (-0.9111 and -
2.1025, before and after). We found that the impact of the number of reward options 
would be underestimated if we do not consider endogeneity. This implies that if there is 
endogeneity, as there are more backers contributing to the project, the creator will 
strategically be more likely to add reward options. The negative impact of the number of 
reward options would be even larger.  
The other difference in the estimation is that the sign of the variance of quality 
signal is reversed before and after correcting endogeneity (-0.6437 and 0.5465, before 
and after). Before correcting the endogeneity, the negative sign of 1γ  indicates that when 




project quality. After correcting the endogeneity, the positive sign indicates that when 
backers donate into lower dollar value rewards, it gives a more precise signal of the 
project quality. As we explained earlier, lower dollar value rewards are more likely to be 
more generic reward types while higher dollar value rewards are more unique. The 
possible explanation is that if creators could strategically change the reward structure, the 
backers will not value the high dollar value rewards to get signals as much as getting 
signals from lower dollar value rewards.  
3.8 Counterfactual Analysis  
According to the findings in Section 6, we find that project creators could 
strategically manipulate the reward structure. In this section, we conduct several sets of 
counterfactuals to investigate: (1) the impact of adding a new reward option to the reward 
structure; (2) the impact of changing the timing to make changes to the reward structure. 
We simulate the above scenarios using the following project setting. The project 
category we choose is film category. The starting reward dollar structure for the project is 
$10, $10, $10, $10, $50, $50, $50, $50, from top to bottom. We fix the reward type5 for 
each reward to be the same so that the only difference across reward options is the 
location on the reward menu for this project. We set the project quality to be the sum of 
the quality mean and quality standard deviation in the film category 6 . The project 
duration is set 30 days.  
                                                 
5 In the simulation, the reward type for each reward is a combination of decorative item, in-kind 
item, contributor acknowledgement, backer engagement, and unique reward.  




3.8.1 Adding a Reward Option to the Reward Structure  
In this part, we investigate the impact of adding a reward option to the reward 
structure. Here we fix the timing of making such changes, such as toward the end of the 
project duration. We simulate two different cases: (1) adding a reward, such as $5, above 
the focal $10 reward options; (2) adding a reward, such as $30, below the focal $10 
reward options.  
The main findings are as below: (1) in Figure 3.1, we find that adding a reward on 
top of a popular reward could make the popular one even more popular; however, the 
total number of backers actually decreases compared to the original reward structure. (2) 
In Figure 3.2, we could see that adding a reward below the popular reward distracts 
attention from other rewards and make existing rewards less popular.  
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Figure 3.2 Change of number of backers - add below reward options 
3.8.2 Changing the Timing of Making Changes to the Reward Structure 
In this section, we conduct experiments to study the impact of different timing in 
changing the reward structure. In other words, we make the structure change either (1) in 
an early stage or (2) in a relatively later stage.  
The main findings are as follows: (1) in Figure 3.3, we could see that adding a 
reward above a reward in an early stage distracts attention from other reward options. 
Therefore, it actually slows down escalation of rewards becoming popular ones and not 
make the other reward options even more popular; (2) however, adding a reward above a 
reward in a later stage could help make the already popular reward even more popular 
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Figure 3.3 Change of Number of Backers - add above reward options (t = 11) 
 
3.9 Conclusions and Implications 
A crucial aspect to the functioning of these collaborative economies is the 
incentive structure that encourages participation. In this paper, we have used the 
structural modeling approach to study how providers or project backers respond to 
dynamic changes in non-monetary incentives in reward-based crowdfunding, one type of 
the collaborative economy. First, our reduced-form analysis showed that a change in the 
project reward structure over the course of the project duration increases the odds of 
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levels that have been popular options till date or that have gained recent popularity are 
perceived to be more favorable if they are pushed lower down the menu of options, 
presumably by introducing weaker or less attractive options ahead of them in the menu. 
This implies that project creators could strategically and dynamically design the reward 
structures during the funding period to attract more backers. This finding suggests that 
cognitive theories of consumer choice behavior such as Contrast Principle or the theory 
of Context-dependent preferences may have a crucial role in the successful dynamic 
design of non-monetary incentive structures. According to the counterfactual analysis, we 
find that adding a reward above reward options in a later stage could help escalate the 
popular rewards become even more popular compared to making changes in an earlier 
stage.  Furthermore, when adding reward above the popular rewards, adding above the 
popular ones could make the popular ones even more popular while making the total 
number of backers decrease.  
Our research is of significant importance to both academic research and industry 
practice. On one hand, we could provide some guidelines to the project creators regarding 
how to strategically manipulate the reward structures to incentivize users to participate. 
On the other hand, our research extends and contributes to incentive design in 
crowdfunding and collaborative economy in general. To our best knowledge, this is the 
first paper to investigate the non-monetary incentive design in crowdfunding. This 
pioneer work can easily prompt the investigation of other interesting research questions 
in this area.  
The current research has some limitations that could be addressed in future 




how the results are contingent on different categories. We are working on generalizing 
the findings to more categories. Secondly, when we categorize the reward descriptions, 
we focus more on characterizing rewards into different categories. If the quantity 
differences could be considered as well, the results would be more interesting. Those 





CHAPTER 4. EFFECTS OF INFORMATION AND COUPONS ON 
CUSTOMERS’ PURCHASE BEHAVIORS: A FIELD 
EXPERIMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we develop a SVM based approach to identify customers to be 
nudged when dealing with products faced with supply constraints. Also we investigate 
how well the identified customers could be converted by nudging strategies, such as 
sending out information and/or coupons using emails. In this chapter, we further explore 
the effects of the nudging strategies on customers’ purchase behaviors. Specifically, we 
explore the short-term and long-term role information and coupons play in shaping 
customers’ behaviors and also the effects of information and coupons on influencing 
different types of customers.  
Email targeting has emerged as an important digital channel to offer personalized 
promotions to customers. Email coupons are similar to traditional offline coupons in the 
sense that they are targeted to individual customers. Coupons often act as a marketing 
tool to charge a lower price to customers who have a lower willingness-to-pay. This view 
is supported by a set of empirical work studying the characteristics of customers who take 
advantage and redeem the traditional offline coupons (Swaminathan and Bawa 2005; 
Chiou-Wei and Inman 2008). However, surprisingly, given the popularity of email 




 targeting specifically probably because of limited access to such marketing data. 
Interestingly, in one of recent papers on email targeted promotions, Sahni et al. (2014) 
analyzed data from a set of field experiments on an online platform and found that email 
promotions could serve as a role to inform customers. Although their work expands the 
role of coupons from just attracting lower willingness-to-pay customers to informing 
customers as well, they do not differentiate impacts of email targeting of different 
promotion depths. In another stream of marketing literature, characteristics of coupons, 
such as promotion depths (10%, or 20% off discount), have also been broadly studied and 
shown that they have significant different impacts on customers’ price expectations 
(Kalwani and Yim 1992).  
To our best knowledge, there is no work investigating how email promotions of 
different depths plays different in informing customers or acting as a price discrimination 
tool. Also, if coupons could serve as a form of “advertising”, why not just send out 
information or “advertisements” instead of digital coupons? Does the high discount 
coupon play the same role in informing customers as the low discount one does? Also, in 
our context where there is limited product availability, strategies other than just sending 
coupons may be more desirable. For some customers, it is sufficient that we provide 
information alone but no coupons. Also, when a coupon is provided, customers may 
perceive the product unpopular and therefore may anchor their valuations for the product 
lower (Dodson et al. 1978). The anchoring effects have to be considered when sending 
coupons. Little has been formally studied about the different impacts of information 





In this paper, we explore the aforementioned research questions using data from a 
field experiment run in an online grocery store. Analysis of the experimental data 
revealed some interesting managerial insights. We find that low coupons are more 
effective in performing as an information role in the long term than pure information 
strategies. However, high coupons serve more as a role in attracting price sensitive 
customers in the short term and do not perform well in the long run in informing the 
customers. We find that customers who are new to the store are more likely to be nudged 
by high discount coupons; whereas customers who have engaged with the store over a 
longer duration are converted using information.  However, we did not find coupons with 
a low discount value to be as effective. We also provide a possible explanation for our 
observations.   
In this chapter, Section 4.2 presents the relevant prior literature on coupons and 
email targeting. The experiment design will be described subsequently. Section 4.4 
analyzes the data from the experiment. Conclusions and implications will be discussed in 
Section 4.5.  
   
4.2 Literature Review 
In this part, we review prior work that is related to our study: (1) effects of 
coupons on customers’ expectation and purchase behaviors; (2) effects of characteristics 




4.2.1 Effects of Coupons on Customers’ Expectation and Purchase Behaviors 
There has been a lot of research that study the impact of traditional offline 
coupons on customers’ expectation and purchase behaviors. Prior literature has found 
conflicting effects of coupons on consumers’ choices and brand evaluations. Neslin and 
Shoemaker (1989) found that promotions negatively influence brand evaluations. 
However, Davis et al. (1992) provided disconfirming evidence regarding this aspect. In 
addition, research shows that consumers’ choices are positively impacted by the discount 
rate (Leone and Srinivasan 1996). However, price promotions could also reduce 
postpromotion choices because the brand quality could be reduced (Dodson et al 1978), 
or customers’ price expectations could be lowered (Monroe 1971).  
Although email targeting becomes widespread in industry, we found there is only 
limited amount of work studying the impact of targeted emails on those behaviors, 
probably because of limited access to the marketing data. Wattal et al. (2011) study 
implications of personalization of email contents. Kumar et al. (2014) study the impact of 
marketing activities on the propensity of a consumer getting in and out of email 
marketing lists. Sahni et al. (2014) analyzed 70 randomized experiments and found that 
targeted promotions can serve as a form of “advertisement”.   
4.2.2 Effects of Characteristics of Coupons on Effectiveness of Promotions  
Characteristics of coupons include promotion frequency (how frequent a coupon 
is targeted to customers), promotion depth (to what extent the price is discounted, such as 
10% or 20%), and promotion frame (percentage off versus cents off). Research shows 




expectations (Kalwani and Yim 1992). There is also work that study how promotion 
frame moderates the effect of promotion depth on postpromotion price expectations and 
choice (DelVecchio et al. 2007).  
Although Sahni et al. (2014) concluded that targeted promotions can serve as a 
form of “advertising”, its findings are quite general regardless of the characteristics of the 
promotions. Actually in their data, email promotion offers consist of different promotion 
depths and promotion frames. To our best knowledge, there has been no research so far 
that studied if different promotion depths play different roles in informing customers. 
Also no prior work has compared the role of coupons versus pure information. In other 
words, if coupons could serve as a form of “advertising”, why not just send out 
information or “advertisements” instead of digital coupons? Specifically, in our context 
where there is limited product availability, strategies like sending out pure information 
about the product, other than just sending coupons, may be more desirable in certain 
circumstances. Therefore, we conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness and 
effects of information and/or couponing in influencing customers’ behaviors.  
4.3 Experiment Design 
We conduct a field experiment in an online grocery store to investigate different 
roles of promotion depths in informing customers and the impacts of information and 
coupons on different types of customers. The research context is the same as used in 
Section 2.6.1. The experiment design has been shown in Table 2.3. The experiment 
procedures have been described in Section 2.6.1 and Section 2.6.2.  We will not repeat 




4.4 Analysis and Discussion 
We conduct two sets of analysis in this section. First, we analyze the experiment 
data and investigate the information carryover effect of information and coupons in 
nudging customers to purchase. Second, we further understand the effects of information 
and coupons in converting different types of customers.  
4.4.1 Information Carryover Effects of Information and Coupons 
In this section, we analyze the role of coupons of different promotion depths in 
influencing customers’ behaviors. Given our research focus, we only consider subjects 
who opened the promotion emails in our experiment, and track their behaviors one season 
following the experiment7.  
First, we calculate the conditional conversion rate under different treatments. The 
conditional conversion rate is defined as the proportion of customers who purchased the 
product conditional on their opening the emails. Given the availability of the data we 
access, two types of conditional conversion rates are calculated: (1) the short term one, 
which is directly influenced by the treatments they receive during the campaign period, 
when customers could redeem the coupon they received; (2) the long term one, which is 
purely influenced by the information they receive in the campaign period but there is no 
such coupons available during the subsequent one season following the campaign period.  
Table 4.1 shows that the number of subjects opening the emails is consistent 
across the treatments but that the conversion rates are not. The table segregates customers 
based on when they purchased the product – either during the campaign period or outside.  
                                                 
7 The period following the experiment is not strictly one season give the restrained access to the 




Note that, even if customers had purchased during the campaign period, we do not have 
access to information about whether they actually redeemed the coupon or not.  For the 
rest of the analysis, we assume that any purchase during the campaign involves the 
redemption of the coupon.  Observe that during the one week campaign, the high coupon 
appears to produce the best outcome. A large number of customers took advantage of the 
offer to evaluate the product. Amongst the low coupon treatment, the conversion rate is 
perhaps the worst. We will evaluate that aspect of the result later.  Surprisingly, we find 
that the extent to which discounts are offered do not have a monotonic variation with 
respect to conversion rates. Following the campaign period, the conversion rates are the 
lowest for the high coupon treatment. The total conversion for the entire season is similar 
across the information only and low coupon treatments. The main summary is that high 
coupons are quite effective during the campaign period. However, the low-coupon may 
play a role similar to the information only treatment. Perhaps, it may be the reason why 
customers did not buy as much during the campaign period but bought it later. 
In other words, in the short term, intuitively, we can see that high coupons are 
statistically more effective in converting customers to purchase the product compared to 
the other two (one-side t test, p<0.01). Interestingly, the effectiveness of low coupon is 
statistically even worse than just sending out information (one side t test, p<0.01). 
However, in the long term, surprisingly, low coupon treatment has the highest impact to 
convert customers to purchase while high coupon treatment is statistically the worst. In 
other words, we found that low coupons are more effective in performing as an 
information role in the long term than pure information treatments. However, high 




Table 4.1 Performance of Treatments in the Experiment 
  





during the  campaign 
Conditional conversion 
rate in 1 season (excluding 
conversions during the 
campaign) 
High Coupon 70 20.00% 4.29% 
Low Coupon 63 4.76% 7.94% 
Information 70 7.14% 5.71% 
 
Secondly, we convert the summary data from Table 4.1 into an influence 
proportion matrix8, which is shown in Table 4.2. The rows in the table represent the 
treatments while the columns are the condition under which the converted customers are 
influenced to purchase. For example, in the “Low Coupon” row, 4.76% of customers who 
opened the email in the campaign period bought the product during the campaign period 
while 7.94% eventually purchased the product within a season after the campaign period. 
Those 7.94% customers purchased because of the information received but not the low 
coupon treatment. As seen in Table 4.2, there are some N/A values, which means there is 
no such data for this cell. In the previous example, there is no such data for the high 
coupon column under low coupon treatment (row).  
Table 4.2 . Influence Proportion Matrix 
 Information Low coupon High coupon 
Information 12.86% N/A* N/A 
Low coupon 7.94% 4.76% N/A 
High coupon 4.29% N/A 20% 
*N/A denotes that there is no such data for this cell as explained in the main text. 
                                                 





Based on the t test statistics9, we found that promotions do cause a significant 
carryover effect even to the season after the promotion ended, not only to the week after 
the promotion expires (Sahni et al. 2014). More specifically, we found that low discount 
promotions could cause a higher carryover effect than information only treatments while 
high discount promotions could not. That said, in the long run, it makes sense that low 
discount promotions are sent out to certain customers than just sending out information 
only emails. Even though low coupons may make customers perceive the product on 
promotion as low quality, it does provide a long term effect in informing customers and 
nudge them to purchase it.  
4.4.2 Effects of Treatments on Customer Types 
Next we study how well the treatments affect different customer types.  For this 
analysis, we again restrict the analysis to subjects who opened the emails.  The number of 
subjects who opened the email was 203, of which 34 converted.  Among the converts and 
non-converts, we are interested in retracting the characteristics of those customers. We 
used a logit regression model to evaluate how well the feature set of the individual 
customer predicted their conversion (1 as converts and 0 as non-converts).  The feature 
set in this logit model also includes the treatment the subject was assigned to. 
Interestingly, we find that only the “purchase” variable (i.e. the number of previous 
purchases) to be a significant factor.  As a next step, we estimated a different logit model 
where we interacted “purchase” with treatments.  Even though the interaction terms are 
not significant, it appears to indicate that high coupons are more effective when 
                                                 




customers has little prior purchasing experience (Refer to Appendix C for details about 
the two logit models we run.). This motivates our analysis in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1 Average Number of Previous Purchases 
 
Following our previous analysis, we analyzed the number of previous purchases 
made by the customer segments.  Figure 4.1 captures both the average number of 
purchases made by top 1000 customers identified by SVM (bars with inclined lines) and 
the average by the converts (bars with horizontal straight lines).  This figure shows that 
customers with relatively fewer purchase experience react positively to the high coupon 
treatment compared with other treatments. 
In the previous analysis, we only focused on the aggregate level analysis with 
respect to treatments. Because we would like to analyze the reaction of individual 
customers, we also consider the survival analysis. The survival analysis also gives 
insights into when the customer would purchase the product without interventions and 




provided in Appendix D.  The hazard function is estimated based on customer data at the 
end of 2013 using non-parametric methods. They are shown as the blue curves in Figures 
4.2 and Figure 4.3, where the horizontal axis “lenfol” represents the number of previous 
orders customers have placed. Note that the hazard rate function is right censored because 
we do not observe the customer population for duration beyond 2013.   
 





Figure 4.3 Hazard function and customers identified by how they were influenced to 
purchase the focal product 
 
Figure 4.2 identifies the purchasing customers based on the treatments that they 
were subjected to. Because the coupon had a validity period and not all customers 
purchased within the period, we identified customers who purchased subsequent to the 
coupon validity as having been affected only because of information. Figure 4.3 simply 
accounts for whether information played a role or not.  Notice between the figures that a 
large number of customers in the low-coupon treatment purchased the product 
subsequent to the window. It appears that the figures are consistent with findings in 
Figure 4.1 in that high coupons are effective with relatively newer customers. One 




providing emails with health related messages possibly does not attract attention.  
Offering high coupons may gain their attention. On the other hand, for experienced 
customers, their purchasing habits are relatively set routines.  So, information is sufficient 
as a nudge.  
4.5 Conclusions and Implications 
In this chapter, we analyzed data from a field experiment and investigate if 
promotions of different depths play a different role in informing customers in a short term 
and long term. We found that promotions do cause a carryover effect even to the season 
after the promotion ended, not only to the week after the promotion expires (Sahni et al. 
2014). More specifically, we found that low discount promotions could cause a higher 
carryover effect than information only treatments while high discount promotions could 
not. Furthermore, we find additional managerial insights. We find that customers who are 
new to the store are more likely to benefit from high coupons, while relatively older 
customers are converted using information. Coupons with a low discount value, however, 
are not found as effective as the other two strategies.  
Our work has both significant theoretical contributions and industrial implications. 
First, our paper enriches the promotion literature on email targeting. Second, the work 
extends findings from prior literature on the information role that coupons play both in 
the short term and long term. From the perspective of the marketing managers, they could 
strategically leverage coupons of different promotion depths and/or information 
depending on their objective. For example, high coupons could attract attention of 




customers’ price expectation. Low coupons actually could play an important role in 
informing customers in a relatively long term, which is even higher than purely sending 
out information. Additionally, we offer insights regarding how to actively nudge using 
different strategies for different types of customers.  
Although our work convey interesting findings, we admit there are some 
limitations. Firstly, our results are only based on one field experiment. It would be 
interesting to test our results on more experiments in which different promotion frames 
could be used as well. Second, only one product is involved in the experiment. It would 
be more insightful to validate this result using different product categories. Besides, given 
the limited access to the individual level data in the experiment, we could not conduct 
more sophisticated analysis, such as difference in difference approach. If individual level 
purchase data is available in future field experiments, it would be interesting to conduct 





CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
With the increasing availability of information technologies, shaping customers’ 
behaviors is more easily accomplished given the company’s ability to adapt their 
offerings according to customers’ demand as well as track customers’ online behaviors.  
In this dissertation, predictive analytics, structural model and field experiments are 
employed to analyze vast amount of data to understand customers’ online purchase and 
contribution behaviors.  Our work makes significant contributions to the information 
systems, supply chain, recommender systems, predictive analytics, email marketing and 
crowdfunding literatures. The interdisciplinary nature of our research highlights the role 
of big data analytics in understanding and nudging customers’ behaviors. Therefore, our 
work also generates meaningful insights to business managers.  
In Chapter 2, we develop a SVM based approach to identify limited number of 
customers to be nudged to purchase products with supply constraints. We evaluate and 
compare the proposed approach with other existing techniques via a randomized field 
experiment. We find that, in terms of the successful nudges, our SVM-based approach 
performed better than other approaches. Our findings generate insights to business 
managers on what techniques they can use to identify potential customers to be nudged 




We are not only focusing on nudging customers to purchase. In Chapter 3, we pay 
attention to nudging customers to contribute, specifically, in a reward-based 
crowdfunding platform. We develop a structural model to understand backers’ learning 
and pledging behaviors. We use it to test a variety of behavioral theories of how PRS and 
intertemporal changes in the PRS influence backers’ pledging decisions over the course 
of a project’s funding period. Interestingly, estimation results show that reward levels that 
have been popular options till date or that have gained recent popularity are perceived to 
be more favorable if they are pushed lower down the menu of options, presumably by 
introducing weaker or less attractive options ahead of them in the menu. From the 
counterfactual analysis, we further show that project creators could strategically add a 
reward option above popular rewards in a relatively later time period to make the popular 
options even more popular.  
In Chapter 4, we further investigate the impact of different nudging strategies, 
such as information only, low discount, high discount, on customers’ purchase behaviors. 
We evaluate the effectiveness of those different nudging strategies via a randomized field 
experiment. Consistently with prior literature, we found coupons could serve as a form of 
“advertisement”. Furthermore, our findings provide evidence that coupons with a low 
discount value could have a longer information carryover effect than those with a higher 
discount one. We also evaluate how well the identified customers are nudged through 
information and/or couponing.  The experiment shows that customers who are new to the 
store are more likely to benefit from high coupons, while relatively older customers are 
converted using information. Coupons with a low discount value, however, are not found 




In conclusion, this dissertation leverages state-of-the-art methodologies, such as 
predictive analytics and structural modeling, and analyze enormous amount of data to 
understand and nudge customers’ purchase and contribution behaviors in two types of 
online engagement platforms. We propose methods to identify customers to be nudged, 
study impacts of different nudging strategies, and also model customers’ behaviors so 
that effective nudging strategies could be provided to business managers. Our work 
makes significant contributions to both the theoretical literature and business practice. As 
big data analytics become more and more popular, there will be more groundbreaking 
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Appendix A      Support Vector Machine 
In this section, we briefly discuss the main idea of SVM. For details, refer to 
Vapnik (2000) and Cui and Curry (2005). SVM classification is also known as 
“maximum margin classifier”. The main idea of SVM is to find a separating 
hyperplane which “lies midway between the convex hulls of the two groups and be 
orthogonal to the shortest line connecting these hulls” (Vapnik 2000).  
There are two forms of the objective function: a primal and a dual form: 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑤𝑤∗ ∙ 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑤𝑤0∗ = ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∗𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) + 𝑤𝑤0∗𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , where 𝑤𝑤  denotes a weight vector, 𝑥𝑥 
represents an input feature vector and 𝑤𝑤0 is a constant.  
The kernel function is specified as ∅(𝑥𝑥 ∙ 𝑧𝑧) = ∅(𝑥𝑥) ∙ ∅(𝑧𝑧). Given this feature 
of the kernel transformation, we can conclude that the solution to the optimization 
problem is the same no matter if the problem is solved in the original attribute space 
using or in the transformed feature dimension.  
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 � 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 12𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 � 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗∅�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗=1  
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.  � 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 are Lagrange multipliers in the original optimization problem.  
The kernel function we use in our capacity constrained supply chain context is 






Appendix B       Examples of Analysis in Section 2.5 
Take training period 10 (April, 2011 to June, 2011) as an example. We use 
customers’ purchase data in period 11 to period 20 to evaluate the number of 
successful predictions from period 10. Figure B.1 shows the cumulative number of 
success over the multiple subsequent time periods. We could see that if we use longer 
time window to observe the targeted customers, some of them do convert to purchase 
in later time periods in a self-discovery manner.  15% of the predictions convert to 
purchase among the top 1000 ranked customers from period 10.  
 
Figure B.1 Accumulative Number of Success in Lifetime Prediction (Period 
10) 
 
Again take the training period 10 as an example. We use the subsequent 10 
periods as the test window, and track the purchase patterns of those top 1000 





track the repeat purchases behaviors of those converted customers, we could find that 
those converted customers do purchase this product repeatedly. On average every 
converted customers come back to purchase 4.2 times. 
 







Appendix C     Analysis Using the Experiment Data 
Conditional on customers opening the emails, we investigate how customers 
behave to convert to purchase or not purchase. We use converts/non-converts (1/0) as 
response variable in the logit regression model. We use features of those customers 
and treatments (dummy variables) as predictor variables. We conducted several 
additional analysis to understand what types of customers are more prone to convert 
under different treatments. We have the following findings.  
First, as shown in Table C.1, we put all the predictor variables in the logit 
regression and found only the purchase experience i.c. the number of previous orders 
has a significant impact on the conversion odd (p<0.01).  
Table C.1 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Model 1 




Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -3.9352 0.7549 27.1747 <.0001 
highDummy 1 0.6704 0.5109 1.7216 0.1895 
lowDummy 1 -0.0903 0.5743 0.0248 0.8750 
Beef 1 0.6444 0.6655 0.9377 0.3329 
Pork 1 0.7777 0.6435 1.4607 0.2268 
otherRedMeat 1 0.7288 0.7384 0.9743 0.3236 
poultry 1 0.6667 0.6363 1.0978 0.2948 
seafood 1 0.5952 0.6508 0.8364 0.3604 





Table C.1 continued 
diary 1 0.5287 0.6278 0.7090 0.3998 
notMeat 1 0.3334 0.6173 0.2918 0.5891 
organic 1 -0.1363 0.2126 0.4109 0.5215 
nonOrg 1 -0.0809 0.2235 0.1311 0.7173 
grassfed 1 -0.4590 0.6769 0.4599 0.4977 
nonGrass 1 0.6273 1.3108 0.2290 0.6323 
price 1 0.00811 0.00439 3.4158 0.0646 
purchase 1 0.6170* 0.1922 10.3071 0.0013 
*parameter significant at at least 99% confidence level 
Secondly, another logit regression model with interaction term between 
number of previous orders, which is significant, and treatments is analyzed to study 
how this effect would change with respect to different treatments. Results are shown 
in Table C.2. Even though the interaction effects are not significant, the model with 
interaction terms does provide a better goodness of fit and indicate customers’ 
different responses to the treatments. (The direction of impact of high coupon/low 
coupon is also consistent with our findings in Figure 4.2). This in fact motivates us to 
analyze the hazard ratio along the number of previous purchases and plot Figure 4.2 





Table C.2 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Model 2 




Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 1 -2.8870 0.7183 16.1527 <.0001 
highDummy 1 1.3611 0.8748 2.4210 0.1197 
lowDummy 1 -0.9704 1.1627 0.6966 0.4039 
purchase 1 0.1710* 0.0941 3.3005 0.0693 
highDummy*purchase 1 -0.0946 0.1220 0.6013 0.4381 
lowDummy*purchase 1 0.1748 0.1532 1.3028 0.2537 






Appendix D      Survival Analysis 
The primary focus of survival analysis is to model the hazard rate,ℎ(𝑡𝑡), which 
describes the instantaneous rate of an event occurring at time t. The event in our 
context is defined as customers’ discovering and purchasing the focal product, which 
is grass-fed beef.  The mortality of a customer is assumed to occur as soon as the 
customer purchases the grass-fed beef. The number of purchases between a 
customer’s first purchase in this store and his first purchase of the grass-fed beef 
product is the longevity of the customer in our dataset.  Note that the longevity in our 
dataset is right-censored, because we have purchase history information only until 
2013.   
The “hazard” function, ℎ(𝑡𝑡),  which describes the probability of the event 
occurring at time t �f(t)�, conditional on the subject's survival up to that time t (S(t)), 
is  ℎ(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑟𝑟)
𝑆𝑆(𝑟𝑟).  Kernel-smoothed estimators of the hazard function h(t) are based on 
the Nelson-Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard function 𝐻𝐻�(𝑡𝑡). Details on using 
individual level data for estimating ℎ(𝑡𝑡) could be found at SAS (2010). The Nelson-
Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard function is a non-parametric estimator and 
is given by 𝐻𝐻�(𝑡𝑡) =  ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖≤𝑟𝑟 , where di  is the number of customers who discover and 
purchase the product out of ni  potential customers in interval ti .The estimator is 
calculated, then, by summing the proportion of those potential customers who 
discovered and purchased the product in each interval up to time t. The estimated 







Appendix E    A Sample of Reward Description Categorization 




























The Appreciator: A 
"Special Thanks" shout 
out on our Facebook Page 
for being a valued 
supporter of these great 
men and what they are 
doing. 






The Good Deed:A Special 
Thanks on the official 
"Cycle of Life" Facebook 




0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
100 
The Supporter: Everything 
listed in the above 
donation categories plus 
an Official "Cycle of Life" 
T-Shirt and an additional 2 
"Cycle of Life" bracelets. 
A special thanks in the 
credits and a DVD copy of 
the completed 







The Activist: A Total of 
10 "Cycle of Life" 
Bracelets. 2 T-Shirts ， 1 
Dry-fit custom Designed 
exercise shirt ， a "special 
thanks" in the credits ， as 
well as a digital copy of 
the project upon 
completion. 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
500 
The Producer: You will 
receive all of the above 
listed rewards as well as a 
co-producer credit in the 
completed documentary. 






The Executive: All of the 
rewards listed above 
except you will be 
acknowledged as a 
Producer in the credits of 
the documentary. 
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